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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
CURTIS GALEN GREEN SIMPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940471-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has original appellate jurisdiction over defendant's conviction for violating 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 1994), a third-degree felony and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
412(l)(d) (1995, a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). This 
appeal challenges the trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction on a lesser-
included offense. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly refuse to give the jury an instruction regarding a lesser 
included offense? 
This issue is solely a matter of law, which this Court reviews nondeferentially for 
correctness. State v. Peterson. 881 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
All relevant provisions are attached to this brief as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural history 
On March 14, 1994, the State charged defendant with criminal conduct arising out of 
an incident on March 8, 1994 (R. 10). The State later amended the information, dismissing 
three counts and charging defendant with evading a peace officer, a third-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 1994) and retail theft, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(d) (1995) (R. 46-47). A jury convicted 
defendant of the charges on June 16, 1994 (R. 110) and the trial court sentenced him to one 0-
to 5- year term in prison, for the felony conviction, and one six-month jail sentence, to be 
served concurrently, for the misdemeanor violation (R. 123). 
Statement of facts 
On March 8, 1994, at approximately 9:30 in the evening, Jerry Peterson was working 
at the Hillside Farms gas station in Scipio, Utah when he saw a car pull up to the gas pumps 
(Tr. of trial before Hon. Guy R. Burningham, June 16, 1994, at 41-48).l From his location in 
the station, Peterson saw defendant use the pump to fill his car with $10 in gasoline and then 
speed away toward 1-15, without paying (Tr. 41-48).2 Peterson remarked to Brad Robinson, 
1
 The transcript of the trial was not paginated as part of the record; therefore, throughout this brief, the 
State will cite to the page of the transcript itself. 
2
 The jury also convicted defendant of retail theft, a class B misdemeanor, for taking gasoline without 
paying for it. He does not challenge that conviction on appeal. 
2 
who was in the station, "There goes a gas skip." (Tr. 52). Robinson left the station, got in his 
car and followed the vehicle toward 1-15 until he was able to see and write down the license 
plate number (Tr. 58). After getting the license plate number, description of the car, and 
route of travel, Robinson then returned to the gas station and gave the information to Jerry 
Peterson, who called it into the sheriffs office (Tr. 60). Deputy Sheriff Scott Correy of the 
Millard County Sheriffs Office heard the radio dispatch, which contained the vehicle 
description and license plate number and drove to intercept the escaping vehicle (Tr. 74-76). 
Deputy Corney positioned himself at mile marker 216 on the freeway and observed 
southbound traffic coining from Scipio (Tr. 75). Shortly afterward, a vehicle matching the 
description and license plate number passed by; therefore, Correy pulled behind the vehicle 
and followed for approximately four miles (Tr. 83). After another police car came to assist 
him, both police vehicles turned on their red and blue strobe lights, red and blue flashing 
lights, sirens, and wig-wag lights (flashing headlights) (Tr. 79). Immediately after the police 
turned on their lights and sirens, defendant sped up from 60 miles per hour to 85 miles per 
hour (Tr. 79-80). Both police vehicles sped up to pursue and were always within a half car 
length to a car length behind the defendant (Tr. 80). During the chase, Deputy Correy also 
turned on his spotlight, illuminating the interior portion of defendant's car (Tr. 82). At one 
point, the defendant pulled down his rear-view mirror and his passenger threw a metal object 
out the window (Tr. 82-83). The pursuit continued for eleven miles, with all vehicles 
maintaining the eighty-five miles per hour speed and the defendant weaving between lanes 
(Tr. 83). Finally, the car then slowed down and eventually pulled off to the side of the road 
where he was arrested (Tr. 83). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the facts of this case, the trial court correctly refused to give the jury the option 
of finding the defendant guilty of the offense of willfully failing or refusing to comply with the 
lawful order of the police; therefore, the jury properly convicted defendant of the offense of 
attempting to flee a police officer. 
A lesser included offense is properly given only when the evidence at trial provides a 
rational basis upon which the jury can convict a defendant of the lesser offense and acquit him 
of the charged offense. Here, the chase occurred after defendant stole $10 in gasoline from a 
convenience store. Defendant took the police on a high speed chase on 1-15 for 11 miles, 
during which he was weaving between lanes and ignoring all attempts, by flashing lights and 
sirens, to slow him down. Defendant did not contest the evidence, but argued that the jury 
should infer that he did not act willfully. However, even if the defendant had presented 
evidence showing he was merely confused when the police repeatedly signaled him to pull 
over and stop, this evidence would not have justified the giving of a lesser included offense, 
because it would have acquitted him of both offenses. Either the defendant was guilty of 
attempting to flee or he simply was not guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED NO RATIONAL 
BASIS FOR ACQUITTING THE DEFENDANT OF 
FLEEING OR ELUDING THE POLICE, THE TRIAL 
COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO CHARGE THE JURY 
WITH A LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION OF 
WILLFULLY FAILING OR REFUSING TO COMPLY 
WITH A PEACE OFFICER. 
4 
The State charged defendant with violating Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1995) 
(Addendum B), which makes it a third-degree felony for a driver to willfully and wantonly 
disregard a visual or audible signal from a police officer or attempt to flee or elude a police 
officer by vehicle or other means. At trial, defendant asked the court to charge the jury with 
an instruction for a lesser-included offense, i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13 (1988) 
(Addendum C) , which makes it a class A misdemeanor to willfully fail or refuse to comply 
with the direction of a police officer. This misdemeanor statute also criminalizes a willful 
failure or refusal to comply with a flagger, firefighter, or uniformed school crossing guard. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13 (1988). 
Defendant's right to present his theory of the case to a jury is not absolute, but is 
restricted by the evidence found at trial. State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1983). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1995) obligates a trial court to give a lesser included 
instruction only when "there is a rational basis for a verdict acqutting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." The test consists of two parts 
that require the court to conduct a legal and factual analysis: First, the court must compare the 
statutory elements of the two offenses to see whether a greater-lesser relationship legally exists 
between them. Second, the court must examine the evidence to determine whether the 
defendant can, factually, be acquitted of the greater, but convicted of the lesser, offense. 
In the facts of this case, defendant did not contest the prosecution's testimony. This 
unchallenged testimony showed that on March 8, 1994, the defendant was driving a Mercury 
Cougar on 1-15, approximately four miles north of Fillmore, Utah (Tr. 75). Deputy Scott 
Correy followed this car and then, after he was joined by another patrol car, he and the other 
5 
police vehicle turned on lights and sirens (Tr. 78). Immediately, the defendant sped up from 
60 miles per hour to 85 miles per hour and began weaving between lanes (Tr. 78). Defendant 
continued driving in this fashion for eleven miles IdL Although no previous Utah decision 
court has explained what facts must be presented to establish an attempt to flee or elude a 
police officer, in interpreting a similar provision, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that 
merely ignoring a police car's activated emergency lights could evidence an attempt to flee or 
elude. State v. Russell. 229 Kan. 124, 622 P.2d 658, 662 (1981). Indeed, the dictionary 
definition of flee, as meaning "to run away" perfectly describes defendant's eleven-mile ride. 
Webster's New International Dictionary at 965 (Merriam Webster 1938, 2nd. Ed., 
Unabridged). 
Unquestionably, defendant willfully refused to comply with Deputy Correy's order to 
pull over. However, to justify the lesser included instruction, the evidence must have been 
susceptible to more than one rational interpretation; that is, a jury must reasonably infer that 
defendant's eleven mile journey was nothing more than a willful failure or refusal to comply. 
State v.Crick. 675 P.2d at 527, 531 (Utah 1983); United SfflCS v Sinclair, 414 F.2d 888, 891 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
In Driscoll v. United States. 356 F.2d 324 (1st Cir. 1966), the criminal defendant 
appealed a criminal conviction for willfully failing to file a tax return. He alleged that the jury 
should have been given a lesser included instruction for non-willfully failing to file a tax 
return. The court refused to give the jury instruction on the grounds that the defense had 
presented no evidence to contradict the finding of willfulness. Driscoll. 356 F.2d at 326. In 
response the defense stated that his plea of not guilty was sufficient to place the lesser included 
6 
offense before the jury. I&. In dismissing that argument, the federal court of appeals 
concluded that when the government made out a "compelling case, uncontroverted on the 
evidence, on an element required for the charged offense but not for the lesser-included 
offense, there is a duty on defendant to come forward with some evidence on that issue if he 
wishes to have the benefit of a lesser-included instruction." I$L at 327. 
Similarly here, the State's case was uncontroverted. The defense called no witnesses of 
its own, nor was it able to impeach the prosecution witnesses. In fact, what defendant believes 
is a justification for a lesser included instruction actually would justify only an acquittal and 
not a conviction for the lesser offense. At closing argument, defendant's counsel invited the 
jury to speculate on what defendant was thinking: "I doubt that any of you have gone 11 miles 
with sirens blaring, but we don't know what's going through Mr. Simpson's mind. We don't 
know that he didn't freeze. You've heard of people that freeze up and can't deal with a 
situation for an extended period of time. I mean we're talking ten minutes. We just don't 
know." (Tr. 121). Had the defense produced any evidence for this thesis, however, the jury 
still could not have acquitted defendant of the greater offense and simultaneously convicted 
him of the lesser offense. Instead, if defendant had actually been unable to follow the police 
directions, then he would have lacked the proper intent to commit either offense and the jury 
would have been required to acquit him. 
Under the admitted facts, defendant ignored the officer's activated emergency lights 
and tried to run away.3 When he took these actions, he not only refused to comply with the 
3
 Defense counsel said as much at closing argument: a[R]emember he did go 80 miles an hour. He did do 
it for 11 miles." (Tr. 122). Deputy Correy actually stated that defendant went 85 miles an hour (Tr. 82). 
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police, he attempted to flee. Although defense counsel suggested at closing argument that 
"fleeing" required more than just speeding up by 25 miles per hour for eleven miles and 
weaving between lines, (Tr. 122) not every attempt to flee must be an action-packed thriller to 
deserve criminal sanction. 
The "attempt to flee" statute was designed specifically for the kind of high-speed police 
chase that defendant caused. The prohibition on willfully failing or refusing to comply with a 
police officer originated in the Uniform Vehicle Code, a set of laws put together by the 
National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. In a notation to Uniform 
Vehicle Code Ann. § 11-103, the model version of section 41-6-13 on willful failure to 
comply, the reporter notes that, as of 1967 when the volume was written, ten state laws 
carried the prohibition on refusing to comply with an officer a step further by forbidding 
drivers from fleeing from or eluding the police: "These statutes [fleeing and eluding] are based 
on the general concept of a wilful [sic] or wanton disregard not only for the command of the 
police officer, but also for the safety of persons and property that might be endangered, as for 
example, from a high speed chase." Uniform Vehicle Code Ann. § 11-103 at 137 (1967). 
The annotation cites to the Utah version of the "attempt to flee" statute that was in 
effect in 1967, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169.10 (Supp. 1965).4 From the reporter's comments, 
the "fleeing and eluding" statute is best thought of as an aggravated form of willfully failing or 
refusing to comply.5 When the evidence provides a rational basis for only the aggravated 
4
 The legislature has amended this section numerous times and also has renumbered it. It now appears at 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 1994) and is the statute of which defendant was convicted. 
5
 It might also be thought of as eleven-miles, worth of refusals. 
8 
version of a crime, then giving a lesser included offense is improper. Peterson. 881 P.2d 965, 
967(no credible evidence to show that entry, required by the aggravated burglary statute, did 
not occur; therefore, giving lesser offense not appropriate). Athough no Utah court has 
commented on the relationship between the "refusal to comply" and "attempt to flee" statutes, 
the Arizona Court of Appeals has construed analogous statutes in a factually similar case. 
In State v. Gendron. 804 P.2d 95, 99 (Ariz. App. 1990), a jury convicted Gendron of 
attempting to flee police when he took them on a forty minute high speed chase. Like the 
defendant here, Gendron asked the trial court to give a lesser included instruction for willfully 
refusing to comply with a police direction. Gendron. 804 P.2d at 98. The appellate court 
upheld the trial court's refusal to give the lesser instruction, stating: "It is undisputed that 
Gendron failed to stop his motorcycle when he was pursued by Cramer. The only issue is 
whether defendant was justified in doing so. If he is guilty, he can only be guilty of the 
offense charged and no other."). Here, the same reasoning applies. Either defendant was 
guilty of attempting to flee or he "froze," in which case he was guilty of nothing at all 
Defendant was not in the catatonic state that his counsel suggests. Not only was he able to 
keep his foot on the gas pedal for ten minutes, move the car between lanes, and talk to the 
passengers, he also turned down his rear-view mirror, which showed that he was aware of the 
flashing lights and was trying to ignore them. These are not the actions of a person frozen in 
fright, but of a person desperately, albeit clumsily, running away from the police. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINTON REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument and a published opinion in this matter because the 
relationship between the two statutes at issue here, i.e., willfully failing or refusing to comply 
and attempting to flee a police officer, have never been addressed by a Utah court. Further, 
no Utah decision has set forth facts required to show the commission of either offense. 
Because these issues require further development, rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, justifies oral argument and a fully reasoned opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J^Kday of April 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode -
Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising 
out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single 
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under 
different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any 
other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless 
the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials 
for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned 
on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not 
be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so included 
when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the 
offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included 
offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if 
such relief is sought by the defendant. 
ADDENDUM B 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic controllers. 
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any 
peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or maintenance site, or uniformed adult 
school crossing guard invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. 
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall 
use devices and procedures conforming to the latest edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices for Streets and Highways." 
ADDENDUM C 
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer fs signal to stop - Fleeing -
Causing property damage or bodily injury - Suspension of 
driver's license - Forfeiture of vehicle - Penalties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to bring 
his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to 
interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or 
elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The 
court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than 
$1,000. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death or serious bodily 
injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting to murder or aggravated murder, 
is guilty of a felony of the second degree. The court shall, as part of any sentence under this 
subsection, impose a fine of not less than $5,000. 
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other section, an operator 
who, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a 
stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or 
endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace 
officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license revoked pursuant to 
Subsection 41-2-127(l)(h) [53-3-220(l)(h)] for a period of one year. 
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward it to the Division of 
Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the conviction. If the court is unable to 
collect the driver's license, the court shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If 
the person is the holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not 
collect the driver's license but shall notify the division and the division shall notify the 
appropriate officials in the licensing state. 
